People are often challenged to select one among several alternatives. This situation is present not only in decisions about complex issues, e.g., political or academic choices, but also about trivial ones, as in daily purchases at a supermarket. We tackle this scenario by means of the tools of statistical mechanics. Following this approach, we introduce and analyze a model of opinion dynamics, using a Potts-like state variable to represent the multiple choices, including the "undecided state", that represents the individuals that do not make a choice. We investigate the dynamics over Erdös-Rényi and Barabási-Albert networks, two paradigmatic classes with the small-world property, and we show the impact of the type of network on the opinion dynamics. Depending on the number of available options q and on the degree distribution of the network of contacts, different final steady states are accessible: from a wide distribution of choices to a state where a given option largely dominates.
I. INTRODUCTION
People frequently face diverse situations that offer a wide choice of options, such as when looking for a restaurant, hotel, phone model or any basic good in the supermarket. The number of goods increases every day. It is estimated that approximately 50000 new products are introduced every year in the US [1] . Even within each category of items, there may be many brands and item variations without differentiated attractiveness. This leads to the problem of facing too many choices, termed "overchoice" or choice overload [2] . To make decisions in such situations can be costly, and this stressful process leads to poor decisions or no decisions at all [3] [4] [5] . Then, the advantages of multiple choices can be canceled by the disadvantages of a more complicated choice process. In fact, despite representing, apparently, a positive development, many options may hinder the process of choice. For example, people with many purchase options tend to have more difficulty in choosing and may end up buying nothing [6] . Motivated by these observations, we wonder to what extent people interactions, leaving aside their individual psychology, contribute to this scenario by introducing, for instance, conflict and frustration. Then, by means of a model of opinion dynamics, we investigate the distribution of adoptions made by a population facing a large number of choices.
In modeling people's interactions, one of the basic ingredients is imitation, or social contagion. In fact, imitation occurs in diverse social contexts, from the dynamics of language learning to decision making. Depending on the questions posed, diverse rules of contagion, from simple pairwise to group interactions, have been proposed and studied in recent years [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . However, very few works deal with many choices [17, 18, 27, 28] . In the vast majority of opinion models, the opinion of an agent is represented by a binary variable, since many questions can be tackled through the assumption of two possible (opposite) attitudes, e.g., being either favorable or unfavorable to a given choice. This kind of binary variable was also inspired in the spin-1/2 Ising model, leading to transpose known results from physical to social questions. For our present purpose of studying multiple-choice situations, it is natural to consider a Potts-like state variable that can take several (discrete) values.
We consider that changes from one state to another are governed, not by simple pairwise contagion, like in Refs. [18, 27, 28] but, instead, by a "plurality" rule [17] . This is grounded on the idea that an individual makes the choice that is the most popular among its contacts. In fact, when we have to choose or buy something, especially when there are so many similar options that there is not a favorite one a priori and is not feasible to examine them all, it is reasonable to take into account other people's preferences [29] . Naturally, the closer is the person in our network of contacts, more importance we give to its opinion, since nearest neighbors in the network typically have similar interests and tastes. One can use that strategy not only in trivial or daily life issues but also in major ones such as political elections where many candidates compete. For changing or adopting a new opinion, however, a minimum of consensus amongst the contacts is necessary. This is expressed in a plurality rule, according to which an individual is persuaded to adopt the opinion shared by the largest number of its nearest neighbors.
Evolution rules based on a locally dominant opinion have been considered before, for instance, the majority rule for two states introduced by Galam [19, 20] . It was later extended to multistate opinions [17] , by considering all-to-all interactions where the individual and all its contacts adopt the same opinion of the majority at the same time. A variant where, instead of the local majority, the plurality opinion is considered was also studied [17] . But in the situations we address here, the decisions are not taken in groups or simultaneously, rather the choices of the individuals are affected by their knowledge of the previous choices of theirs contacts. Therefore, we assume that one single individual opinion changes at a time. Moreover, we will include the possibility of undecided people, which is a realistic feature, which has been taken into account in 3-state models, as natural extensions of binary cases [22] [23] [24] [30] [31] [32] . Furthermore, as another differential, the dynamics of our model takes place in small-world networks, that, even if do not facilitate analytic treatment, are more realistic than regular or mean-field settings. As paradigms of small-world networks, we consider two classes with distinct degree distributions: Erdös-Rényi (ER) [33, 34] and Barabási-Albert (BA) [35] networks. The details of the model will be defined in Sec. II.
The model encompasses instances where the different alternatives have similar initial attractiveness. Many products sold in the internet with similar qualities and prices, e.g., music albums, shoes, etc., are within the model scope. We also make the simplification that individuals can differ only in the number of contacts. Other heterogeneities of the agents might be also introduced in further work. By now, we ask a basic question: how a plurality rule molds the decision spectrum in the simplest, homogeneous, case?
First, we address the classical issue in this kind of problems, about whether a consensus 4 state can be achieved or not, where all (or almost all) of the individuals share the same preference. Then, in simulations of the model, we compute the fraction of the realizations reaching consensus. In non-consensus situations, we analyze the distribution of adoptions.
We also compute other relevant quantities such as the fraction of undecided people and the fraction of the population adopting the most popular alternative. The results will be presented in Sec. III.
II. PLURALITY MODELING
A plurality rule governs the opinion dynamics of N agents interacting through their network of contacts. Each agent i, corresponding to a node in the network, has a Pottslike opinion state variable S i , that can take the values s 1 , . . . , s q representing q electable alternatives (options or choices, that we enumerate in an arbitrary order), as well as an "undecided" state s 0 , assessed when the individual has not adopted a defined option. The addition of the undecided state reflects the fact that sometimes people do not have a favorite choice.
We focus on the dynamics developed in ER and BA networks, as representative of smallworld networks with homogeneous and heterogeneous degree distributions, respectively.
However, for comparative purposes we will also consider random neighbors and nearest neighbors in a square lattice (with periodic boundary conditions).
We assume that most individuals do not have a formed opinion a priori, except for initiators representative of each offered choice. Then, we start the dynamics with all nodes in the S = s 0 state, except randomly chosen q nodes, to each of which we attribute a different opinion S = s 1 , . . . , s q . We consider the same number of initiators (one initiator) for each alternative, reflecting the equivalent attractiveness of all the alternatives. This kind of initial state has been used in opinion models for proportional elections [36] .
At each Monte Carlo (MC) step of the dynamics, we visit all the nodes of the network in a random order and update them successively, in asynchronous mode. The state of the visited node i is updated according to the following steps:
(i) We define the set of nodes, A i , formed by i and its nearest neighbors.
(ii) We determine the plurality state S (iii) The agent i will then adopt its corresponding plurality state.
Notice that, when we measure the state S p i , we ignore the nodes in A i that have S = s 0 (see Fig. 1 ) but the current opinion of site i also counts to define S p i . The updates are repeated and the dynamics stops when an absorbing state is attained, i.e., if, at a MC step, none of the nodes changes its state.
Let us remark that this dynamics differs from that of the Sznajd type [37, 38] where two or more individuals sharing the same opinion impose it to all their neighbors. It also differs in several aspects from the plurality rule introduced in Ref. [17] : i) while in our case only the central node is affected, in [17] the whole group A i changes its opinion to the plurality state S p i in a single update step, ii) here the size of the interaction group A i is given by G = k i + 1, where k i is the connectivity of site i, instead of being constant (anyway, the parameter k +1 plays the role of an effective G, and they coincide in the limit of a highly homogeneous, or regular, network); iii) the possibility of indecision is not contemplated in [17] ; iv) in an event of tie, the opinion of node i remains unchanged in our model, while, in [17] figure) and its neighbors form a group A i . In the case shown in the figure, the plurality state is S 6 dominant options is randomly selected. With respect to this last item, the present dynamics is more close to the majority rule version of Ref. [17] , where the dynamics becomes static because, when there is no local majority, the state of the group does not change. v) In terms of the underlying network, here we consider small-world networks, while the dynamics in
Ref. [17] was studied in the mean-field limit and over a square lattice. vi) Finally, another important difference is in the initial conditions: we consider that decided nodes are diluted in a sea of undecided nodes, instead of equiprobability of definite opinions.
III. RESULTS

A. Plurality dynamics
We follow the evolution of each realization of the dynamics until the final state is attained. Distinct distributions of opinions can emerge in the final state depending on the amount of alternatives q, the average connectivity k , the network topology and size N . (c) For even larger connectivity (e.g., k = 30), consensus is likely.
(d)-(f) When q is large, the number of undecided agents does not decrease monotonously when the connectivity increases. But, increasing the connectivity, consensus is reached, although it can take a larger time than for small q.
In all cases, the number of undecided nodes decreases with time, because undecided individuals are not produced by the dynamics in the present version of the model, but only introduced in the initial condition.
The dynamics in ER networks can be qualitatively understood as follows:
In a first regime, each opinion propagates invading the undecided neighbors. If the initiators are very diluted (q N ), and the connectivity is not too high, then each cluster of nodes with the same opinion can develop almost independently of each other, during several MC steps (non-competitive regime). In this case, the initial growth is nearly exponential, described approximately by dn s /dt = k n s in ER networks.
When two or more clusters collide, a competitive regime starts. Depending on the network, the competition can take place more or less evenly so that ties stagnate the evolution avoiding wide dominance of a given opinion (as in Fig. 2 .a, 2.d and 2.e). Otherwise, a sort 8 of rich-get-richer or cumulative advantage mechanism can take place. In that case, the winner opinion becomes noticeably larger than other ones, convincing individuals from other opinion clusters (Fig. 2.b) or even the whole network ( Fig. 2.c ).
Similar patterns as those shown for ER networks are also observed for BA networks, although for different values of the parameters, as illustrated in the first column of Fig. 3 .
Notice that the winner opinion, as well as the number of decided people, for the same parameters, are favored in BA networks, where cumulative advantage effects are more accentuated.
Let us remark that in some extreme situations, given the initial conditions studied here (one initiator for each state), the system does not evolve. This occurs, for instance, in the limit case when q = N (hence, each individual has a defined opinion) or the connectivity of all sites is N − 1 (complete graph). In those extreme cases, ties forbid changes of state and the dynamics is frozen from the start. However, we will restrict the range of the parameters to the region q, k N . In regular lattices, the evolution is essentially non-competitive. Clusters grow from their initiators and, when they collide, the dynamics freezes due to ties in the interfaces, without entering a competitive phase, in contrast to ER and BA networks where there are longrange links that break ties. Since the initial growth occurs at the surface of the cluster, then dn s ∝ √ n s which, differently from small-world networks, gives a quadratic increase of n s with t, as observed in Fig. 3 (second column). Alternatively, it is easy to show that, for the synchronized update, at short times, the number of adopters of each choice grows around its initiator, following, in average, the recursion relation n s (t) = n s (t − 1) + Kt, where K = 4
for the square lattice. By solving this recursion equation, one obtains
that yields the predicted quadratic increase with t, valid for small t, until n s N/q holds.
Despite the prediction is done for the synchronous update, it is in good agreement with the average value of the simulated curves, as can be seen in the second column of Fig. 3 .
As a consequence of the lack of competition, the final values of n s are less disperse in the square lattice than in random networks and, mainly, consensus, or even a wide dominance of an opinion, becomes unlikely for q > 1.
In the absence of any network structure (i.e., when neighbors are chosen purely randomly), like in the examples of the last column of Fig. 3 , one of the opinions dominates and attains consensus, even for very small K. This can be understood in terms of a mean-field approach, following the lines of Ref. [17] . In fact, the fraction of undecided sites f 0 = n s 0 /N follows an equation of the typeḟ
where P K−1 is a polynomial of order K − 1 in f 0 whose coefficients depend on the fractions f s ≡ n S /N , with S = s 1 , . . . , s q and P K−1 (0) > 0. For all K and q, the factor f 0 arises from the central undecided node that is part of the group. Therefore, in the steady state it must be f 0 = 0. Moreover, since P K−1 (0) > 0, Eq. (2) is stable for f 0 = 0. The remaining equations for the other fractions f s have solutions of the type found in Ref. [17] for their majority and plurality versions. In particular, the stable solutions are those of consensus, where f s j =1 for some j (hence, the remaining fractions vanish).
For instance, for K = 2 and q = 2 (let us call f s j ≡ f j , 0 ≤ j ≤ q), we havė
It is easy to obtain that the only stable solutions are (f 0 , f 1 , f 2 ) = (0, 0, 1) and (f 0 , f 1 , f 2 ) = (0, 1, 0).
Similarly, for K = 3 and q = 2, once f 0 = 0, we havė
that lead to the consensus solutions as the stable ones, while equipartition f 1 = f 2 = 1/2 is unstable. The equations above, for small values of K and q, valid for f 0 = 0 in the present model, are the same obtained for the majority and plurality versions studied in Ref. [17] , although the equations in three cases differ for enough large values of K and q.
Increasing K leads to equations of the formḟ 1 = f 1 f 2 (f 1 − f 2 )P K−2 (f 1 ), where P K−2 is a definite positive polynomial of order K − 2 in f 1 , whose coefficients depend on f 2 . Therefore, consensus is always stable for q = 2.
For large number of alternatives, f 0 necessarily must vanish as well, and consensus is also a stable solution. For instance when q = 3 and K = 2, once f 0 = 0, we havė
that lead to the consensus solutions as the stable ones, while equipartition
is unstable, and the solutions of the type (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0, 1/2, 1/2) are saddle points.
Increasing q and K, the structure of fixed points becomes more complex and more routes to consensus emerge [17] . Nonetheless, consensus is always the final state, which was also verified through numerical simulations.
Differently, when the structure of the interaction network is relevant, non-trivial behaviors occur, as those illustrated in Fig. 2 . A population of undecided people can survive and consensus is not always attained.
B. Phase diagram
To summarize, the nontrivial final configurations that emerge in ER and BA networks, we built a phase diagram in the plane k − q. For each realization, we monitored the fraction of decided people
and also the fraction of nodes sharing the most adopted opinion, or winner choice,
These quantities were averaged at the final state of several realizations. Unless said something different, at least 50 realizations were considered for each set of values of the parameters. For each realization of the dynamics, a different network was generated. The averaged fractions will be denoted by f d and f w , respectively.
We also computed the fraction p c of the simulations that reach consensus (operationally meaning at least 99% of the population).
When performing computations over ER networks, only the main component of the graph was considered.
The phase diagram in the plane of parameters k − q, for ER and BA networks is depicted in Fig. 4 . We restricted the analysis to the region q ≤ N/10 and k ≤ N/1000. In BA networks, for sufficiently large q ( > ∼ 200) the critical value k c 7 becomes independent of q. In contrast, in ER networks, the dependence on q is stronger. The non-consensus domain for ER networks, (p c 0, blue region), when q becomes sufficiently large, spreads over the region of large mean connectivities. It means, that near the transition frontier, eliminating a few alternatives can trigger consensus, an effect which in BA networks only occurs for connectivities below k c 7 .
Concomitantly, in the shadowed area in Fig. 4 .a., the fraction of decided people becomes minority (f d < 0.5). Differently, in the BA case, the majority of nodes is decided over the whole phase diagram. Moreover, even in the absence of consensus, the winner group can become majority (f w > 0.5), more easily in BA networks.
In the following sections III C and III D, we describe in more detail the dependency on q and k , respectively.
C. Effect of the number of options q
In this section, we focus on the impact of the number of opinions q on the steady state, and we also discuss size effects. then, their quantity over all q clusters is n s 0 ∝ L 2 /q × q/2. Therefore, the decided fraction
As a consequence, the curves of have low connectivity and can be easily convinced by a decided neighbor. On the other hand, the occurrence of a local plurality is less likely in an homogeneous ER network with a given connectivity. As a consequence, ties are more frequent, more nodes remain undecided and the dynamics freezes. However, in square lattices, despite the homogeneity, the undecided fraction is relatively small. This can be understood as follows. Ties occur when distinct opinion clusters collide, then, the surviving undecided nodes are located at the "interfaces".
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In networks with long-range links the encounter of different clusters occurs early, and many nodes remain undecided, meanwhile in regular lattices with nearest-neighbor interactions, undecided nodes are being conquered until the collision, late in the dynamics, when the opinion groups have occupied most of the lattice and few undecided nodes remain at the interfaces.
The average fraction of the population adopting the winner option, f w (squares) is also a significant quantity. (Necessarily f w ≤ f d .) The fraction f w is greater in BA networks. That is, the winner choice conquers in average a large fraction of the population in BA networks, compared to ER networks and square lattices with equivalent k . In fact, the cumulative advantage that drives the growth of an opinion group is facilitated in these heterogeneous networks due to the presence of hubs, and the winner conquers more adopters. Also notice that, in ER networks, when the fraction f d attains the flat level, a dominant opinion is absent, as mirrored by the very small value of f w (see Fig. 5 .a). Meanwhile, in BA networks the winner can always conquer an important fraction of the population (Fig. 5.b) , shown by the fact that f w remains finite (except in the limit q → N ).
For all kinds of networks, the probability of occurrence of consensus, p c (circles), typically falls from 1 to 0 as q increases. This agrees with the intuition that, when there are more options to choose, it is more difficult to attain consensus. The probability of consensus decays rapidly with q and, above a critical value q c , the fraction p c becomes negligibly small.
This effect is accentuated in the square lattice where for q c = 1. Let us start by the case of BA networks (shown in Fig. 6 .b) that exhibits a simple monotonic behavior, for the range shown in the figure. The three fractions increase with the connectivity. As observed in the phase diagram of Fig. 4.b, Fig. 6 .b shows in more detail how the jump to consensus becomes more abrupt as q increases and the critical value of the connectivity becomes nearly independent of the number of options ( k c 7), as also observed in the phase diagram.
Differently, in ER networks (see Fig. 6 .a), k c increases with q. Moreover, the average fraction of decided people f d first decreases with the connectivity down to a minimal value localized at k min . Up to that point, the fraction of simulations attaining consensus p c is negligibly small. But, at k min , a transition occurs and both p c and f d rapidly increase with k , up to 1. One would expect to have more decided nodes when the connectivity is higher, like in the case of BA networks, since, in principle, more connections might facilitate information spreading. However, on a low connected network, opinion groups are typically isolated from each other. When links are added, and disconnected groups become connected, ties can occur. That is, on the one hand higher connectivity implies that groups of different opinions can be more connected among them and compete. On the other, a node will be aware of more opinions, making difficult the decision and keeping more undecided nodes.
Therefore, not only overchoice (high q) may produce stagnation of the dynamics but also "overlink" or excess of contacts due to high k . This explains the initial decrease of f d with k which occurs up to a minimal value of f d . After that point, introducing more connections will allow a dominant group to impose its opinion, concomitantly p c increases until reaching its maximal value 1. Also notice that in ER networks, for large values of q,
there is an interval of mean connectivity for which the fraction of decided people becomes minority.
The existence of an abrupt transition from a situation where many opinions coexist to consensus indicates that, by adding just a few links or by removing a few choices, most people may come to adopt the same state. The transition to consensus is more abrupt in BA networks, and the jump width decreases with q. In these networks, as discussed above, there is a dominant winner opinion group, that represents an important fraction of the population (finite f w ). The largest group gains additional adopters more easily, with cumulative advantage. Near the critical connectivity, when adding few links at random, it would be more probable to connect the very large group to smaller ones, and, as a consequence, they would be conquered by the dominant opinion, rapidly leading to consensus. In homogeneous ER networks this transition is less abrupt, because a largely dominant group is less probable.
The width of the transition region slightly increases with q. For the extreme case of nearest neighbors interactions in square lattices, cumulative effects are completely absent, therefore, a transition to consensus is unlikely. 
E. Distribution of opinions and empirical data
In non-consensus steady states, a broad distribution of opinions across the population can emerge. In order to analyze the shape of the distributions, we built the normalized histograms of P (n s ), where n s is the number of nodes with a given opinion s. Histograms were computed by accumulating realizations ending in non-consensus states. Typical distributions are depicted in Fig. 7 . One can identify exponential, log-normal and power-law behaviors.
In the ER case, far enough from the critical frontier of consensus, the preferences are almost uniformly distributed with an exponential cutoff. When approaching consensus (for instance by increasing k ) the distribution adopts a log-normal shape. Notice that this occurs in the region of the phase diagram where indecision prevails (shadowed area in Fig. 4 ).
In BA networks, the distribution can also resemble a log-normal, but when approaching consensus the tail rises due to the existence of dominant winners. Moreover, when the dynamics freezes early, P (n s ) tends to reflect the degree distribution with exponent −3.
In order to compare the distributions from simulations with those from real world, we considered products than are rated online. We analyzed data about items whose alternatives are not significantly differentiated (for instance, in price and/or quality), as assumed in our model. We identified q with the number of items within each category and we considered the amount of positive reviews (those of 4 and 5 stars) received by each item as indicator of its total number of adopters, that potentially might become spreaders of the product, in a situation alike that described by the present model. We analyzed all music albums from Google Play music [40] , whose prices are similar (U$ 9 ± 3). We also analyzed male sneakers from Netshoes [39] , a Brazilian e-commerce for sport goods. Since in this case the prices are more disperse, we split the data into two subsets: items with prices below and above the median (about R$ 200). For each set of data we computed the histogram of the number of adoptions (i.e., number of reviews attributing 4 and 5 stars), as shown in Fig. 8 . Comparison of Figs. 7 and 8 put into evidence a remarkable qualitative similarity between real and simulated distributions producing log-normal shapes. The shape for small values of n s is also similar. Once service users have access to the reviews of any other user, the underlying network is expected to be similar to a random graph with relatively high connectivity. Since purely random (mean-field) interactions would lead to consensus, which is not observed in empirical data, one concludes that the underlying network must have some structure. The absence of a fat tail, related to the presence of hubs, as in BA networks,
indicates that the empirical cases are best modeled by ER networks, at least qualitatively.
In fact, in a "rating network", reviews are equivalent and none of them is expected to act , of the number of (favorable) reviews n s , with 4 and 5 stars, for
Netshoes [39] and Google Play music [40] . It is reasonable to identify the number of items with q, and the number of reviews giving 4 and 5 stars with the number of decided people n d . For Google Play musics, prices are similar (U$ 9 ± 3), then all data were used (n d 1.6 × 10 6 ; q 7500). For
Netshows we split the data into two subsets: items with prices above (n d 9 × 10 4 ; q 1720) and below (n d 10 5 ; q 1720) the median ( R$ 200). The solid lines are log-normal fits.
as a hub, then, it is reasonable that ER networks yield more realistic results in this case.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
We introduced a model based on a plurality rule, that mimics decision making governed The model indicates that consensus can suddenly emerge simply by introducing a few connections or eliminating a few items. Furthermore, it also predicts that an item can become very popular (with relatively large f w ), even if the initial attractiveness of all the items is uniform. These observations furnish another possible explanation of why there is so much amateur content viralizing in the Internet, or why a service, good or cultural product can become a bestseller without having any apparent differentiated attractiveness.
